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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

7 January 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : [REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer  
for China-EAP

SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: China

1. Attached is the assessment prepared on the basis of Community views expressed at the warning meeting on 17 December. This memorandum has not been coordinated with the participants but is being circulated among them.

2. The next warning meeting will be held on Monday, 21 January at 1400 hours in room 7 E 62, CIA Headquarters.

Please provide the name of your representative to [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED], prior to COB Friday, 18 January.

Attachment  
As Stated

Distribution

State - Mr. Robert Drexler  
NSA - [REDACTED]  
Army - Col. Jack Churchill  
Air Force - Maj. Wally Astor  
Navy - Cdr. Stephen Portenlanger  
DIA - [REDACTED]  
SWS - Mr. Douglas J. MacEachen

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REVIEW ON JAN86

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FAC 0158-80

## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

7 January 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning *1/8*

FROM :   
National Intelligence Officer  
for China-EAP

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: China

1. Sino-Soviet Affairs

Analysts agreed that the end of the Moscow round of political talks between China and the USSR did not appreciably change the situation that had prevailed for months. The talks are due to resume at an unspecified time in Beijing; although they have been unproductive -- which was no surprise to analysts -- the inconclusive ending of this first round and the abundant evidence that a stalemate exists did not suggest to analysts that tensions have been raised substantially. At the same time it is evident that there has been no progress in reducing tensions between the two sides -- the ostensible purpose of the talks. Our meeting took place before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The events connected with that act are certain to further sour Sino-Soviet relations, but do not raise immediate dangers of troubles along the common border (assuming China does not drive deep into Vietnam in the near future). One Soviet payoff in its intervention was to encircle China; but in the immediate future Moscow will be preoccupied with South Asia to a considerable degree. The Chinese in turn will be deeply concerned and even fearful as a result of the Soviet action, but they are likely to mask that concern with a show of belligerence. They are not likely, however, to act imprudently and will probably stop short of actions so provocative as to invite a Soviet impasse.

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## 2. Chinese Internal Situation

Analysts looked briefly at internal developments, with most agreeing that there were signs that Deng's political position had again slipped somewhat. There was general agreement that this slippage was not yet great, that Deng's recuperative powers were as always considerable, and that the continuing political ups and downs in Beijing, while worrisome because they were continuing, did not at this juncture signal any danger to major US policy interests.

## 3. Indochina Situation

Analysts generally agreed that the Chinese had put out repeated signals that under present circumstances they hope to -- and expected to -- avoid engaging in another "lesson-teaching" operation in Vietnam. The meeting examined in details various indications of Chinese activities in the Sino-Vietnamese border area, including some signs of troop movements toward the border. There was general agreement, although some minor reservations were expressed, that the Chinese appeared to putting just enough pressure on the border to keep Hanoi from withdrawing troops from northern Vietnam for operations in Kampuchea, and that indications that the Chinese planned something on a scale to affect US policy interests would be visible before action occurred; such indications were not present yet. Analysts also considered the problem along the Thai-Kampuchean border. There was general agreement that fighting was likely to spill over into Thailand, but most analysts believed that the Vietnamese were unlikely deliberately to engage Thai forces in action, although accidental clashes were very possible. There was some division as the consequences of fairly extensive Thai-Vietnamese clashes. Most analysts thought that if these occurred well inside Thai borders and raised the possibility of Thai political destabilization the odds of a Chinese attack on Vietnam rose sharply; a strong minority, however, felt that China had clearly decided against renewed fighting this year. This discussion took place before the Soviet move into Afghanistan. Subsequent informal and selective soundings suggest that a minority view has developed that China might take advantage of presumed Soviet preoccupation in South Asia to move against Vietnam. An opposite, and in the view of the chairman of the warning group, more likely result, is that the Chinese in the near future will be especially cautious about taking actions that would invite a direct Soviet response.

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4. Afghanistan

As noted, the Soviet action took place after analysts had held their monthly meeting. Some possible ramifications of the Soviet move have already been discussed. The key to the direct Chinese response to the Soviet action will be Beijing's attitude toward Pakistan, and the key factors here will be how far China goes in offering public and private support to the Zia regime, on the one hand, and how far it is prepared to go in providing or facilitating support to the Afghan insurgents, on the other. It should be noted that prior to the Soviet invasion the Chinese had been urging the Pakistanis not to get deeply involved with the insurgent movement -- presumably because they feared the Soviets would react by doing precisely what they have not done. Now that the die has been cast Chinese attitudes may change, but Beijing is likely to maintain an acute awareness of Pakistani vulnerability. The next two weeks should give firm indications of the direction in which China plans to move.



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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

21 January 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director of National Foreign Assessment

FROM :   
National Intelligence Officer for China-EAP

SUBJECT : Comments on State Morning Summary Item:  
Important PRC Party Sessions Ahead

1. Action Requested: None, this memorandum is for your information only.

2. Background: You asked for comments on the item in the 20 January State Morning Summary on PRC: Important Party Sessions Ahead. State is correct in predicting major PRC Party sessions this year. Intelligence reports have spoken of sessions of the 11th Party Congress' 5th Plenum this spring followed by a 12th Party Congress later on, which would both determine the position in history of the Cultural Revolution and examine the roles of leaders such as Liu Shaoqi who was purged by Mao in this period. Revitalizing the Party cadre structure will be another major goal.


3. However, it is premature to speculate that Hua Guofeng may lose his position as Party Premier. The top leadership in Beijing has bent over backwards to maintain Party unity, and Hua Guofeng's demotion (even if he were given the honorific position of PRC State Chairman) would unquestionably generate grave strains. Moreover, Hua Guofeng represents the next generation of leaders coming along with whom the present generation must cooperate; those in their 70s and 80s will soon be passing the baton to those in their 50s and 60s. Deng Xiaoping and his contemporaries will not want to offend needlessly the members of the oncoming generation. In fact, an effort clearly has been underway in recent months (presumably under Deng's direction) to build up Hua Guofeng as a leader in his own right.

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4. Nevertheless the problem of ridding the Party of deadwood is a major one and will unquestionably produce much tension and encounter considerable resistance. We might know more about the nature of the problem and possible solutions when we see the full text of the 16 January speech by Deng Xiaoping which was cited in the State Morning Summary. All we have so far is press reports, and we do not know either the circumstances or the nature of the audience.  Deng

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Xiaoping was addressing a meeting of senior officials and reporting to them on the Cultural Revolution. He allegedly gave a very negative evaluation of that political process -- another indication that the PRC's priority task will be to maintain Party unity.



Attachment

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1 - C/NIC

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25 January 1980

Q's and A's for the DCI Worldwide Briefing Asia

Q -- How do you expect the Chinese to react to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? Will they give aid to the rebels?

A -- The Chinese have denounced the Soviet invasion very strongly, and they have said that they will give aid to the Afghan rebels.

Huang Hua, the Chinese Foreign Minister, has just been in Pakistan and he made it plain in a press conference there that China would provide assistance not only to the Afghans but also to Pakistan to help it resist further Soviet aggression. We would expect that any aid to the Afghans would go through the Pakistanis, however -- although China has a common frontier with Afghanistan, it might just be a little too much for the Soviets to take to see China send military equipment directly across its border to the forces fighting the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

(I believe that the DCI answer to the question on this subject on 24 January was just right)

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Q -- Will the US eventually sell arms to China?

A -- While we have announced that we are prepared to consider, on a case-by-case basis, the sale to China to certain carefully-selected items of support equipment also suitable for military use, e.g., trucks, communications gear, and certain types of early warning radar, we have also made it clear that we have not changed our position on not having any plans to sell arms or weapons systems to China.

Q -- What about the item in the New York Times quoting a senior official as saying that the list of what we sell to China could be expanded in time to include more sophisticated items such as transport planes and battlefield computers?

A -- I believe that the note to stress here is the reference to "in time." Much would depend on how the circumstances develop in Afghanistan and other areas of the world where the Soviet Union is attempting to expand its influence, as well as on the rate of progress in our relations with China.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

28 January 1980

15

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM :   
National Intelligence Officer for China-EAP

SUBJECT : East Asia-Pacific Monthly Warning Meeting

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The following items were considered by the Community Representatives:

1. North Korea-South Korea -- Analysts were not aware of any change in order of battle on either side of the DMZ which would suggest hostilities, nor was anything of significance noted in terms of the upgrading of North Korean military capabilities. The "trench" discovered in North Korea north of the Han River estuary was regarded as being a defensive tank barrier; there were indications of possible construction of a defensive nature in the North elsewhere along the DMZ. Further information will be needed to reach a firm judgment as to the purpose of this construction, however.

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The main new element addressed was the political appeal by the North to elements in the South to resume talks on reunification, as conveyed in the twelve letters sent to South Korean political figures including the Prime Minister. It was agreed that inclusion of the Prime Minister was a sizeable concession by the North, which has hitherto not openly acknowledged the ROK government as a body with whom it would have to deal. Presumably the North's intent was to capitalize upon the disarray in the South following the 12 December incident (and of course the Park Chong-hee assassination) by creating divisions within political structure, but the new approach was nevertheless significant and would require watching.

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The question was raised about a possible Chinese role in the North's new political campaign. Doubts were expressed that the Chinese knew in advance about the twelve letters, although as recently as 22 January the Chinese Military Attache in Washington was emphasizing to

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REVIEW ON JAN 86

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25X1 US contacts that there would be no attack by the North and urging the US to pay attention to what it was doing. Rather, the North Korean overtures, as evidenced by a series of high-level Party and Army meetings from the 18th to the 22nd of December, appeared to be an internal response to the situation in the South with a consequent shift in strategy and possibly in policy. It was assumed that the North would spin out this new political campaign before contemplating a return to force. [ ]

25X1 It was reported that the North Koreans were not happy about the Soviet move into Afghanistan, although this position had not been expressed publicly. [ ]  
25X1

### 3. Indochina

Recalling speculation in December that a major Vietnamese offensive was anticipated against Kampuchean resistance forces operating near the Thai-Kampuchea border, analysts discussed the apparent failure of this offensive to materialize. One point of view held that the offensive was, in fact, presently underway although not on the scale anticipated and with the Kampucheans avoiding combat. Frequency of Vietnamese cross border operations had been stepped up, involving reconnaissance, movement of troops into blocking positions, and implantation of mines. Major clashes had not occurred, though, and the Thai appeared to be avoiding contact with the Vietnamese. [ ]

25X1 It was also speculated that toward the end of December, Vietnamese plans had been scaled down and tactics changed due to Hanoi's sensitivity to the pressure of international public opinion. Conceivably Hanoi had decided to live with the current situation on the grounds that the Thai border was sufficiently sealed off to keep Kampuchean resistance at a tolerable level, political trends internationally were in Vietnam's favor, and elsewhere in Kampuchea Hanoi was getting what it wanted in terms of internal control. Vietnamese forces were digging in for a long stay, including planting crops and bringing in NCO's from Vietnam as administrators. [ ]

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It was pointed out that while Hanoi might indeed have decided to live with the situation, it was bearing a very heavy burden as a consequence and following the course which Chinese strategy had hoped for. A Vietnamese decision to launch the kind of operation predicted earlier was not ruled out. Also not ruled out was some Soviet role in influencing the nature and intensity of Vietnamese operations. The assurance on Vietnam's actions given in early January by the Soviet Ambassador to Thailand to Ambassador Ambramowitz were noted. In addition, there was speculation that Vietnam was exercising restraint so as not to involve the US and China in defense of Thailand. [REDACTED]

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No particular change in the nature and level of the Soviet military presence in Vietnam was noted, although further coverage of the subject was needed. [REDACTED]

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No one foresaw any particular part for Sihanouk to play under present circumstances. He was still scheduled to visit the US in February, but his visit to Singapore had apparently been "postponed" indefinitely. [REDACTED]



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28 January 1980

Q -- What intelligence reports do we have of possible Vietnamese attacks on refugee camps in Thailand, as reported in Sunday's Washington Post?

A -- As the article in the Post indicated, we have no hard evidence that any such attacks may take place,

[REDACTED] we would expect that the Vietnamese would be attacking Kampuchean resistance forces among the refugees and in refugee camps rather than striking just at refugees themselves. We are aware that the Vietnamese have been conducting small-scale intelligence penetrations of Thailand to pinpoint the location of the Kampuchean resistance elements. Actually, we have been anticipating for over a month some form of stepped-up military action by the Vietnamese in the Thai-Kampuchean border area against Pol Pot and other Kampuchean forces, with the possibility that hostilities might spill over into Thailand. However, it simply hasn't happened, or at least on anything like the scale we had anticipated. It may be that the Vietnamese are still thinking over carefully the risks to them of expanding the conflict in this area. We are monitoring developments very closely.

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Sunday, January 27, 1968

THE WASHINGTON POST

# U.S. Expresses Concern on Viet Actions

By Don Oberdorfer

Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States expressed concern yesterday about reports of large Vietnamese troop deployments and possible attacks on refugee camps along the Thailand-Cambodia border. A statement issued by the State Department said the Vietnamese military movements pose "a potential threat to the security of Thailand," a U.S. ally.

State Department officials said they have no hard evidence that a Vietnamese attack on refugee centers is imminent, but that a variety of recent indications has raised the level of their concern. Among these, they said, is the report of a defecting former official of the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin army in Phnom Penh that attacks are likely before the end of this month. A step-up in Vietnamese military operations and intelligence patrols as well as a notable increase in

denunciations of international feeding operations in the border area are other indications that were cited.

Another worrisome element, which was not mentioned in the State Department announcement, is new concern about the internal stability of the government of Thai Prime Minister Chamarnan Kriangsak. In an unusual incident, Kriangsak suddenly canceled an official visit to Europe last week amid a labor dispute and reports of a split in the ranks of the government.

Both Vietnam and its sponsor, the Soviet Union, repeatedly have informed the United States and other nations through diplomatic channels that there will be no attack on Thailand, according to U.S. officials. At the same time, Vietnam has continued to charge Thailand with complicity in aiding and feeding anti-Vietnamese insurgents near the Cambodian border. The State Department specifically called on Vietnam and the Soviet Union "to refrain from any action which

would threaten Thailand's security and integrity or endanger the well-being and safety of the noncombatants in the refugee concentrations along the border."

A Vietnamese military offensive against the Cambodian guerrilla forces led by Pol Pot has been expected since late December. (Pol Pot has since been replaced as political leader of the insurgency, but remains the military chief). Although Vietnamese military sweep operations have intensified, State Department officials said the previously anticipated level of combat has not developed yet.

According to U.S. intelligence reports, about 50,000 Vietnamese troops are deployed along the Thailand-Cambodia border. Slightly less than 500,000 Cambodian refugees are reported encamped along the border, with 150,000 other refugees in "holding camps" in Thailand's interior.

Officials expressed particular concern about two large refugee camps,

Nommakwun and Nonsamet, which are north of the area where most of the fighting between the Vietnamese and Pol Pot forces has been taking place. The two camps together are estimated to contain 240,000 to 290,000 refugees.

Asked about possible motivations for an attack against the refugee centers, the State Department officials cited Vietnamese opposition to the international feeding operations at the camps and along the border. A substantial part of the food is taken back into Cambodia, including some food that is placed at regular pickup points for this purpose.

Food represents political influence and possibly even control in impoverished Cambodia, an official noted.

Another possibility is that Vietnamese troops may try to seal the Thailand-Cambodian border to improve their position against the insurgents, according to officials. They said recurrent reports in Thailand had spoken of such an effort.

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THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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National Intelligence Officers

28 January 1980

25X1 NOTE FOR:

FROM :



NIO/China-EAP

Note that hard evidence of chemical warfare use in SEA is still lacking, although a strong circumstantial case has been built up through interrogations of refugees. An Army medical team visited the Lao-Thailand border area last fall to investigate, inerrrogate, and if possible, collect samples. It was unsuccessful in this last regard.

17

10 January 1980

South East Asia - Chemical Warfare

LAOS

The Vietnamese and Laotian forces have used chemical warfare agents against the Hmong tribesman for a period of more than three years, beginning in 1976. Refugees and other sources provide a story of repeated chemical attacks on civilian populations for the purpose of completely eliminating the Hmongs. The refugees consistently relate a pattern of employment which includes rockets, spray and artillery weapons. The symptoms [redacted]

[redacted] lead us to believe that there were three types of chemical agents used: a nerve agent, a riot control agent, and an unknown chemical or combination of chemicals.

[redacted] the CW agents probably were supplied to Vietnamese and Laotian forces by the USSR. It is probable that training in the use of CW agents also was provided by the Soviets.

In addition to Hmong tribesmen, the chemical attacks reportedly destroyed large numbers of domestic animals including oxen, swine and chickens.

We believe that CW munitions are stored at Xiang Khoang (Military Region II), Savannakhet (Military Region III), and Pakse (Military Region IV). The latest reported use of CW against the Hmong was in August 1979.

Kampuchea (Cambodia)

Numerous radio reports and press releases have been received since October 1978 on the use of CW by Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea against Kampuchean dissidents, particularly the Khmer Rouge. Descriptions of symptoms observed in victims of CW attacks were similar to those reported by refugee Hmong tribesmen from Laos and indicate that the same CW agents were used.

If the Vietnamese and their Kampuchean collaborators are not successful in wiping out major resistance in Kampuchea, it is probable that they will resort to greater use of chemical warfare against dissident forces.

Hard evidence that the Vietnamese are employing CW in Laos and Kampuchea will depend on our ability to obtain an environmental sample that is contaminated with a CW agent from a point near a CW attack or on the ability to observe a victim immediately after being dosed with a CW agent. Air, soil, vegetation, water samples contaminated with the CW agent are prime candidates for analysis. Other types of samples are contaminated clothing, blood samples, and spent shells or casings. Care should be exercised in shipping the material for analysis to avoid losing the CW material in the sample by evaporation or degradation; sealed containers are preferable.

THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

29 January 1980

NOTE FOR

FROM:   
NIO/China-EAP

Attached for your information is  
a copy of a research paper done by  
 on "Political Trends in  
Taiwan." The report should be admin-  
istratively controlled to protect  
sources.



*See NFR  
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

30 January 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

25X1

FROM : [REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer for China-EAP

SUBJECT : Warning Assessment for China-East Asia  
Pacific

1. Attached is the assessments prepared on the basis of the Community views expressed at the China and East Asia Pacific warning meetings. These memorandums have not been coordinated with the participants but are being circulated among them.

2. You or your representative are cordially invited to attend the February warning meeting for China-East Asia Pacific in Room 7 E 62, CIA Headquarters, at 1400 on Wednesday, 20 February. We will address the China situation first; China Internal, followed by Sino-Soviet and the Indochina situation; the East Asian situation will then be addressed. Representatives should adjust their times of attendance accordingly. Please provide the name of your representative to [REDACTED] by COB 19 February.

19

[REDACTED]

Attachments  
As Stated

Distribution

State - Mr. Robert Drexler  
Air Force - Maj. Wally Astor  
Army - Col. Jack Churchill  
Navy - Cdr. Robert Cyboron  
DIA - [REDACTED]  
Treasury - Mr. Arthur Long  
SWS - Mr. Douglas MacEachen  
NSA - [REDACTED]

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

28 January 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : [REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer for China-EAP

SUBJECT : East Asia-Pacific Monthly Warning Meeting [REDACTED]

The following items were considered by the Community Representatives:

1. North Korea-South Korea -- Analysts were not aware of any change in order of battle on either side of the DMZ which would suggest hostilities, nor was anything of significance noted in terms of the upgrading of North Korean military capabilities. The "trench" discovered in North Korea north of the Han River estuary was regarded as being a defensive tank barrier; there were indications of possible construction of a defensive nature in the North elsewhere along the DMZ. Further information will be needed to reach a firm judgment as to the purpose of this construction, however. [REDACTED]

The main new element addressed was the political appeal by the North to elements in the South to resume talks on reunification, as conveyed in the twelve letters sent to South Korean political figures including the Prime Minister. It was agreed that inclusion of the Prime Minister was a sizeable concession by the North, which has hitherto not openly acknowledged the ROK government as a body with whom it would have to deal. Presumably the North's intent was to capitalize upon the disarray in the South following the 12 December incident (and of course the Park Chong-hee assassination) by creating divisions within political structure, but the new approach was nevertheless significant and would require watching. [REDACTED]

The question was raised about a possible Chinese role in the North's new political campaign. Doubts were expressed that the Chinese knew in advance about the twelve letters, although as recently as 22 January the Chinese Military Attache in Washington was emphasizing to

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US contacts that there would be no attack by the North and urging the US to pay attention to what it was doing. Rather, the North Korean overtures, as evidenced by a series of high-level Party and Army meetings from the 18th to the 22nd of December, appeared to be an internal response to the situation in the South with a consequent shift in strategy and possibly in policy. It was assumed that the North would spin out this new political campaign before contemplating a return to force. [ ]

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It was reported that the North Koreans were not happy about the Soviet move into Afghanistan, although this position had not been expressed publicly. [ ]

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### 3. Indochina

Recalling speculation in December that a major Vietnamese offensive was anticipated against Kampuchean resistance forces operating near the Thai-Kampuchea border, analysts discussed the apparent failure of this offensive to materialize. One point of view held that the offensive was, in fact, presently underway although not on the scale anticipated and with the Kampucheans avoiding combat. Frequency of Vietnamese cross border operations had been stepped up, involving reconnaissance, movement of troops into blocking positions, and implantation of mines. Major clashes had not occurred, though, and the Thai appeared to be avoiding contact with the Vietnamese. [ ]

It was also speculated that toward the end of December, Vietnamese plans had been scaled down and tactics changed due to Hanoi's sensitivity to the pressure of international public opinion. Conceivably Hanoi had decided to live with the current situation on the grounds that the Thai border was sufficiently sealed off to keep Kampuchean resistance at a tolerable level, political trends internationally were in Vietnam's favor, and elsewhere in Kampuchea Hanoi was getting what it wanted in terms of internal control. Vietnamese forces were digging in for a long stay, including planting crops and bringing in NCO's from Vietnam as administrators. [ ]

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
It was pointed out that while Hanoi might indeed have decided to live with the situation, it was bearing a very heavy burden as a consequence and following the course which Chinese strategy had hoped for. A Vietnamese decision to launch the kind of operation predicted earlier was not ruled out. Also not ruled out was some Soviet role in influencing the nature and intensity of Vietnamese operations. The assurance on Vietnam's actions given in early January by the Soviet Ambassador to Thailand to Ambassador Ambramowitz were noted. In addition, there was speculation that Vietnam was exercising restraint so as not to involve the US and China in defense of Thailand. (S)

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No particular change in the nature and level of the Soviet military presence in Vietnam was noted, although further coverage of the subject was needed.

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No one foresaw any particular part for Sihanouk to play under present circumstances. He was still scheduled to visit the US in February, but his visit to Singapore had apparently been "postponed" indefinitely.



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NEAC 0734-80

# THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

31 January 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning *BS per*

FROM :   
National Intelligence Officer for China-EAP

SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: China

The following items were considered by the Community Representatives at the meeting on 21 January:

## 1. Sino-Soviet Affairs

No increase in tensions along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders had been observed; order of battle on both sides remained essentially unchanged, with no special preparations perceived. While there had been a step-up in Soviet aerial surveillance of the border areas, the Chinese had not reacted. The Soviets had undertaken a rotation of troops in Mongolia which involved a larger number of flights than on previous occasions, but no particular significance was attributed to this development.

Impact of the Afghanistan situation on Sino-Soviet relations was noted in the fact that the Chinese had deferred at least until later this year the resumption of the Sino-Soviet talks on mutual relationships. (The annual talks on navigation along the Amur and Ussuri rivers were to resume on 5 February, however.) The Chinese press had strongly attacked the Soviet involvement, and Huang Hua in Pakistan had said that Chinese would assist both Pakistan and the Afghan resistance forces. Analysts agreed that Chinese aid to Afghan dissidents would not be direct but would go via Pakistan. In any event, the route through the Watkhan corridor was probably snowbound this time of year. No increase in Chinese air strength at fields nearest Afghanistan had been seen.

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Relating Afghanistan to the Sino-Soviet border situation, the Soviets had included the Transbaikalian MR among nine such districts which had been called on to furnish troops to replace reservists called up for the move into Afghanistan. It was possible that the Far Eastern MR would also be called upon to furnish troops. [ ]

Further relating to Afghanistan developments, it was observed that the Soviets had attacked Huang Hua's visit to Pakistan, which occurred just after Secretary Brown's visit to China, as evidence of Sino-US "collusion." The presence in China of a Pakistani military mission was commented upon; the mission's purpose was reportedly to check on the availability of Chinese weaponry, including MIG-21's. (Analysts questioned the willingness of the Chinese to provide MIG-21 aircraft given the limited number in the Chinese AOB.) Sixteen Chinese MIG-19's (F-6's) had been delivered to Pakistan in January.

Finally, analysts called attention to Chinese concern over the role of India, with consequent attention to the need for improving Sino-Indian relations. [ ]

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## 2. Indochina Situation

There was considerable discussion of the apparent failure of the Vietnamese offensive against Kampuchean resistance forces in the Thai-Kampuchean border area to materialize. A Vietnamese troop strength of seven to nine divisions in this general area was reported, but the strategy of the Pol Pot forces evidently was to avoid combat and move away from the borders, thus making Vietnamese operations difficult. It was further possible that the Vietnamese had reached the conclusion that there was no unity among the various Kampuchean groups and hence no real threat. [ ]

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Another possibility addressed was that Vietnam's perceptions of the international scene had a bearing on the situation, e.g., the possible involvement of the US and the Chinese if Vietnamese operations spilled over into Thailand and stirred up Thai resistance. Vietnam and Moscow may well have heeded US warnings sent to both. China was perhaps already taking credit for pinning the Vietnamese down along the Sino-Vietnam border. Vietnam may in addition have made an assessment of the strength of Thai and ASEAN reactions. In this regard, some adjustments in the Thai/ASEAN position toward accommodating Vietnam had been observed, which could have generated a degree of Vietnamese response. [ ]

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One point of view held that the Soviets may have influenced Vietnam to cool the situation in the light of Soviet moves in Afghanistan. Admiral Gorshikov was in Hanoi on 22 December, the date of the Vietnamese offensive supposedly was to begin (Vietnamese Army Day), and could have

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passed along a message to the Vietnamese. Soviet pressure could have been exerted through the logistical support being given to Vietnam by the USSR; some effects on Vietnam of diminished Soviet logistical support had already been observed in the wake of Thai curtailment of Soviet overflights to Vietnam. [ ]

Nevertheless, it was emphasized that Soviet military assistance to Vietnam was continuing, most notably in the arrival in that country of Fitter ground support aircraft (the SU-7, not the SU-17). Conceivably what we were witnessing now was just a temporary hiatus in Vietnamese operations, with the anticipated offensive still to come. The fact that Vietnam was still spread out and pinned down in Kampuchea, with consequent drain on its manpower and economic resources, could hardly be pleasing to the Vietnamese. [ ]


### 3. Chinese Internal Situation

Analysts commented on the apparent development of a conservative trend in China's handling of its internal affairs, as marked by Deng Xiaoping's 17 January speech (which criticized inter alia "big character posters"). Deng himself might have come under pressure from colleagues concerned with public order and discipline to back away from some of the more liberal positions he had taken earlier on individual rights. However, Deng's tactics had been to press forward on an issue, move back when resistance was encountered, and then make a new thrust. He was now pressing cadre reform from within the Party, and may have felt it expedient to take a softer line on other questions while handling the very sensitive matter of cadre reform. [ ]

New faces were reported as appearing at the Party Center, representing leaders identified with Deng Xiaoping. One such was Zhao Ziyang (brought in from Xichuan), who could be slated for a senior position in the Party Secretariat. It was speculated that if such were the case, Deng was possibly seeking to create in the Secretariat an alternate center of power to the Politburo. Leadership trends were likely to become clearer later in 1980, when the 5th Plenum of the 11th Party Congress was expected, followed by the 12th Party Congress. A final evaluation of the Cultural Revolution could be expected from these meetings as well as indications of leadership changes. [ ]

No serious threats to Party unity, national stability, and the personal position of Deng Xiaoping were believed to exist at this time. It was noted that military modernization had not become

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a contentious issue, and that the military had been surprisingly quiet in the face of the lower order of priority assigned to modernization of the PLA. 

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

31 January 1980

Dear Francis:

I am sorry I didn't get a chance to talk to you further about the draft which you read in part. If you have any observations concerning it, I would appreciate your thoughts. It was very good to see you and I am looking forward to seeing you

Warm regards to you and to Savie.

Sincerely,

Ambassador Francis Underhill